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Privacy and the dead 
 
ABSTRACT    
The privacy of the dead might be thought to be violated by, for instance, the 
disinterment for research purposes of human physical remains or the posthumous 
revelation of embarrassing facts about people’s private lives.  But are there any moral 
rights to privacy which extend beyond the grave?  Although this notion can be 
challenged on the ground that death marks the end of the personal subject, with the 
consequent extinction of her interests, I argue that a right to privacy belongs to 
deceased persons in virtue of their moral status while alive and reflects their interest 
in the preservation of their dignity.  The paper investigates what prima-facie privacy 
rights and interests may plausibly be ascribed to the dead and why these need to be 
taken seriously by those, such as archaeologists or biographers, who have ‘dealings 
with the dead’.  
 
 
1. Introduction: Rights for the Non-Existent? 
Can the dead have any moral rights to privacy, and, if they can, how far do such rights 
extend?  What interests might be protected by a posthumous entitlement to privacy, 
and how do these resemble and differ from those of the living?  Some people do not 
get as far as asking the latter questions because they return a resounding ‘no’ to the 
former.  If, as is sometimes claimed, the dead can have no rights, then they cannot 
have a right (or rights) to privacy.  In a private letter of 1813, the US Founding Father 
Thomas Jefferson robustly repudiated the idea of posthumous rights in words that 
have often been quoted:   
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 But the dead have no rights.  They are nothing; and nothing cannot own 
 something.  Where there is no substance, there can be no accident.  This  
 corporeal globe, and everything upon it, belongs to its present corporeal 
 inhabitants, during their generation (Jefferson, 4).   
 
At first sight this may seem the merest common sense.  For how could something that 
doesn’t exist have rights, in either the moral or the legal sense?  If death marks (as I 
shall here assume it does) the extinction of the personal self, then after death there is 
no longer a subject to hold any rights, or to have any relevant interests that may be 
identified as the basis of rights.  To be harmed or wronged, it appears at least 
necessary to exist. 
     Yet common-sense morality is far from permitting us to act however we like 
towards the dead.   Many people believe that it would be wrong, for instance, to 
ignore any reasonable terms of a deceased person’s will, or to insult her memory, or 
to donate her body to medical research against her known wishes.  And among such 
prima-facie offensive acts are some which appear to disrespect the privacy of the 
deceased person: e.g. publishing embarrassing extracts from her private diaries, 
revealing to strangers her medical history, or disturbing her grave.  The puzzle is then 
to reconcile the moral intuitions which posit the existence of obligations towards the 
dead with the seemingly reasonable thought that there can be no obligations towards 
the non-existent. 
    Two decades before Jefferson, Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals voiced what 
initially sounds a similar view to his: ‘It would be absurd,’ wrote Kant, ‘to think that 
someone who has died can still possess something after his death (and so when he no 
longer exists), if what he left behind were a thing’ (Kant, 111).  But, unlike Jefferson, 
Kant did not conclude that this left the dead with nothing, since he thought that even a 
dead person could retain certain abstract possessions, such as a good or bad 
reputation. 
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     In Kant’s somewhat cryptic exposition, ‘a good reputation is an innate external 
belonging, though an ideal one only, that clings to the subject as a person, a being of 
such a nature that I can and must abstract from whether he ceases to be entirely at his 
death or whether he survives as a person’ (111).  The thought here seems to be that 
while it would be absurd to assign ownership of a material thing, for example a house 
or a car, to a dead person, death is no bar to ownership of certain non-material things, 
including those such as esteem, contempt, love or loathing which depend on the 
holding of certain intentional attitudes towards him by the living.  According to Kant, 
a dead person can have rights in relation to living persons on account of his status as 
homo noumenon – that is to say, on account of the humanity that can still be ascribed 
to him despite his current non-existence in the phenomenal world (‘in which he no 
longer exists as homo phaenomenon’) (111).  
    Kant does not specifically refer to offences against the dead concerning their 
privacy, but his claims that the dead are owed respectful treatment and that the 
reputation of deceased persons is important suggest that he would list privacy among 
the abstract goods that can ‘cling’ even to the dead.  Since the posthumous revelation 
of an embarrassing fact about a person could negatively affect the regard in which 
survivors regard him, such revelation, whether malicious or merely casual, would be 
incompatible with the respect that is owed to his humanity (humanity being another 
abstract possession of the dead, in this case one not dependent on the intentional 
attitudes of the living).  A human being, for Kant, is a member of the kingdom of ends 
– the class of beings that deserve to be treated as ends in themselves, possessors of 
intrinsic and not merely instrumental value – and this status is timeless, since it 
belongs to him as homo noumenon in the world of things-in-themselves that lack 
temporal determinations.  A human being, for example Napoleon, is always human, 
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and death does not deprive him of that status.  On the Kantian view, paying due 
respect to Napoleon’s humanity is a permanent moral requirement.    
     This outline of a Kantian argument for ascribing privacy rights to the dead is open 
to challenge on two distinct grounds.  One might, to start with, question the 
underlying metaphysics which finds the non-existence of the dead no obstacle to 
ascribing to them certain possessions, provided only that these are abstract rather than 
concrete.   A Jeffersonian approach might query how even abstract things could be 
owned by the non-existent.  To be sure, we can have intentional attitudes towards 
people who are now dead, and we can quite properly say that the dead remain in our 
thoughts, retain our love and affection, or evoke our continuing admiration or scorn, 
sympathy or distaste; but here the objects of our speech and attitudes are the living 
people as they were prior to their deaths, and not some spiritual or logical ghosts.  But 
it looks as though such ghosts would have to be around still to be the present 
possessors of any interests or rights.  In their absence, there seems nothing for such 
interests or rights to attach to.  As Jefferson said, ‘[The dead] are nothing; and nothing 
cannot own something.’   
   The second ground of challenge is that even if – a very big ‘if’ – the foregoing 
objection were waived or answered, and the idea of rights for the dead were deemed 
acceptable, a lot more argument would be needed to show that among the rights of the 
dead were specifically privacy rights.  To show this, it would be necessary to identify 
the relevant interests of the dead that would be unreasonably set back were their 
privacy not protected.  In the case of living people, the invasion of privacy can 
produce a sense of shame or embarrassment, or an unpleasant awareness of being in 
the public spotlight, or distress at being unable to keep the door shut on one’s personal 
space.  But plainly the dead cannot be affected in these ways.  Nor can the inactive 
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dead’s activities be subjected to intrusive surveillance or monitoring by police or 
press or other nosey agents.  Apparently the breach of privacy can do the dead no 
harm at all.  One might therefore want to question the intelligibility of speaking of 
‘privacy’ in regard to the dead, who are no longer capable of caring about those things 
which concern the living.  What sense is there in speaking of a private or a personal 
sphere for the eternally unconscious?   
     In what follows, I shall consider, and try to answer, these two challenges in reverse 
order.  This is because, while the first is more fundamental from a philosophical point 
of view, there is little point in proceeding to the deeper issue unless we can first 
identify some prima-facie interests in privacy that might be ascribed to the dead.   
 
2. Privacy, Dignity and Consent 
This is not the place to survey in detail the very extensive legal and ethical literature 
on the nature and species of privacy.  Nor shall I join in the long-running debate as to 
whether privacy rights are sui generis or alternatively reducible to certain other sorts 
of rights (e.g. property rights or rights to autonomy or security of various kinds).  1  
But a few remarks on relevant literature are in order. 
      In their seminal essay of 1890, ‘The right to privacy’, the American lawyers 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued that a right to be ‘let alone’ rested on a 
deeper ‘right to one’s personality’, which ruled out not only uninvited intrusion by 
others into one’s home and personal space but also any probing into or publication of 
one’s personal information (except where warranted by some overriding public 
interest).  For Warren and Brandeis, the feature that unified the class of offences 
against privacy was the threat they offered to the individual’s ‘inviolate personality 
(Warren and Brandeis, 125).  However, this attempt to find a common feature of 
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offences against privacy was later challenged in an influential discussion by the jurist 
William Prosser, who argued that there were four disparate ways in which privacy 
could be unreasonably invaded (constituting ‘four distinct torts’ in US law).  
According to Prosser, these were: 1) intrusion into the individual’s seclusion, solitude 
or private affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing facts about him; 3) publicity 
which places him in a false or misleading light (e.g. concerning his tastes or beliefs); 
and 4) appropriation without permission of his name or image (e.g. for advertising 
purposes) (Prosser, 965).   
     It is possible to accept Prosser’s taxonomy of offences against privacy without 
following him in denying that they have anything significant in common. As Edward 
Bloustein pointed out a few years later, while Prosser had usefully demonstrated the 
range of ways in which privacy could be invaded, his arguments left intact Warren 
and Brandeis’s insight that the core of the moral right to privacy (which underpins and 
informs the legal rights) is a right to preserve an ‘inviolate personality’.  In 
Bloustein’s gloss, such a right ‘posit[s] the individual’s independence, dignity and 
integrity; it defines man’s essence as a unique and self-determining being’ (Bloustein, 
971).  As such, it is different from a mere right to property, because a deprivation of a 
person’s property is not an assault on his personality; it therefore lacks the peculiar 
quality of ‘offence and affront’ possessed by an intrusion into his privacy (971, 973).  
Pertinently to our present concerns, Bloustein also resists the idea that the affront to 
dignity or disrespectful treatment is a mere matter of hurt feelings or mental distress; 
rather, it is a sui generis wrong and not reducible to hurt feelings – though it may be 
the ground of such (973, 1002).  This contention has obvious relevance to the issue of 
the privacy of the dead, since while dead people obviously cannot have their feelings 
hurt, they may still (as Kant says) be treated with an unbecoming disrespect.  
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     Employing a slightly different taxonomy from Prosser’s, I shall list a number of 
putative privacy rights which have figured in the literature and ask whether, and in 
what form, these might reasonably be held to be applicable to the dead.  These include 
both positive rights (e.g. a right to control what happens to information about oneself) 
and negative ones (e.g. a right to enjoy one’s home without public intrusion), though I 
shall not labour that particular distinction here. 
 
(A) Rights to a private space: 
(1)  The right to one’s own seclusion and solitude; 
(2)  The right to enjoy one’s own place of habitation without public intrusion. 
 
(B) Rights to the control of personal information: 
 (3) The right to decide what use shall be made of one’s personal details (e.g. 
one’s medical history, religious affiliation or income), and who shall have access to it; 
(4) The right not to disclose, or have revealed by others, embarrassing or 
shameful facts about one’s private life; 
(5) The right not to be placed in a false light in the public eye by either 
misrepresentation or partial representation (e.g. through ‘economy with the truth’).   
 
(C) Rights to private communications: 
 (6) The right not to have one’s private communications (e.g. by letter, 
telephone or email) intercepted or eavesdropped by those for whom they are not 
intended, or at a time that is not intended; 
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 (7) The right not to have information obtained from one’s private 
communications disseminated to third parties (e.g. for their commercial or marketing 
purposes).    
 
(D) Rights over the integrity of the body: 
 (8) The right to preserve one’s bodily privacy and control who views, touches 
or disposes of one’s body or its parts; 
 (9) The right to have one’s body and its parts treated with dignity.  
 
    Needless to say, none of the above rights should be considered as absolute; there 
are many legitimate reasons for waiving them in certain circumstances.  The police 
may quite properly enter one’s home without permission if they have good reason to 
suspect that there is a bomb factory in the kitchen or marijuana plants in the back 
garden.  Similarly, the interception of phone calls or emails can be justified where it is 
reasonably judged necessary to forestall a terrorist outrage or a bank robbery.  In all 
such cases the ground for suspension of the right is the public good, generally 
meaning the prevention of substantial public harm; for most people (if, sadly, not all 
politicians) would regard the promise of very minor increments of public utility as 
insufficient to justify the infraction of any of the listed privacy rights.   
    Which of the foregoing privacy rights might with any moral plausibility be ascribed 
to the dead?  The short answer, I believe, is that they all can. It might seem that (6) or 
(7), at least, have no relevance, for since dead men tell no tales, they make no 
communications that can be monitored or exploited for improper purposes.  Yet it is 
not so very hard to think of ways in which a person may be an active communicator 
after death.  A dying parent may leave a written or recorded message for his children, 
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with instructions that they are not to access it until a certain time has elapsed after his 
death.   If the offspring lack the patience to wait, and read or listen to the message 
before they are meant to, this could be held to infringe the parent’s posthumous 
privacy right of type (6).  It would also be an infringement of that right if someone for 
whom the message was not intended accessed it.  One could also imagine a 
posthumous infringement of a privacy right of type (7) where, for example, some 
unauthorised party obtains access to a private record of his financial affairs left by the 
deceased for the benefit of his heirs, and sells the information for profit.  
    It is perhaps more immediately apparent what form posthumous privacy rights of 
types (1) and (2) might take in the case of the dead, even if the propriety of positing 
such rights is open to question.  Both (1), the right to one’s seclusion and solitude, and 
(2), the right to erect ‘Keep Out’ signs at the entrance to one’s place of residence, look 
as though they can be assigned, mutatis mutandis, to the deceased.  If one’s home is 
one’s castle, then, by analogy, the grave might be thought to be the castle of the dead 
(assuming they have not been otherwise disposed of, for example by cremation).  
When archaeologists, anthropologists or construction companies disturb places of 
interment, they not only enter a ‘habitation’ uninvited but destroy the seclusion and 
solitude of the dead.  The poet Andrew Marvell’s remark to his coy mistress that ‘The 
grave’s a fine and private place’ quickly ceases to be true once researchers or 
developers get to work. 
      But why should anyone care about the disturbance of dead clay (their own or 
anyone else’s)?  Privacy rights (8) and (9), which concern the body, have their prima-
facie analogues in rights concerning the non-disturbance and the respectful treatment 
of the physical remains of the dead.   (Note that (9), when applied to the dead, may be 
less practically restrictive than (8), depending on how the notion of ‘dignified 
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treatment’ of physical remains is construed.)  Yet the dead obviously have no 
distressful experience of unwanted disturbance of their corpses or skeletons.  And few 
people today, at least in western countries, believe that the health of their soul requires 
their remains to continue undisturbed. 2   Yet even those who anticipate no harm from 
future disinterment often dislike the thought of being exposed to view when they are 
long past looking at their best, the mere bony residues of their former selves.  ‘To 
what base uses we may return, Horatio!’ says Hamlet, confronted by Yorick’s skull, a 
sight that makes his gorge rise.  Not many people are ambitious to serve one day as a 
memento mori for the living. 3  And few probably relish the thought of their remains 
becoming a source of useful data for archaeologists or anthropologists, laboratory 
specimens to be measured, dissected, dated and analysed by the myriad means 
available to modern science.  (To consent to this in advance would involve a degree of 
self-sacrificing altruism.)  The point here is that we feel strong distaste while alive for 
the prospect of our loss of privacy when dead.  I shall have more to say below about 
the significance of such anticipation.  The key to this concern is provided by 
Bloustein’s observation that we care about our privacy because we care about our 
dignity.  The main reason why people dislike the thought of having their cranial index 
measured or their DNA extracted after they are dead is that it is detrimental to their 
dignity.       
     Rights of types (3) to (5), the rights over personal information (including 
misinformation), also possess potential relevance to the dead.  Kant urges that it is not 
merely wrong, but specifically wrongs the dead, to spread deliberate falsehoods about 
them in order to damage their reputations (Kant, 111-12).  Retaining a good 
reputation posthumously, Kant thinks, is something that we reasonably care about 
antemortem, though he denies that we have a right to have all our guilty secrets buried 
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with us (‘so that the principle de mortuis nihil nisi bene is incorrect’) (111).  If 
someone had committed a murder, defrauded the public or betrayed his country, he 
would not be wronged, on the Kantian view, if the facts were posthumously revealed.  
But Kant did not share Judith Thomson’s bullish view that rights to privacy regarding 
personal information are generally overridden by ‘a more stringent right, namely the 
public’s right to a press which prints any and all information, personal or impersonal, 
which it deems newsworthy’ (Thomson, 310).  In Kant’s opinion, there is a distinction 
between information about a deceased person that the public has a right to know – 
information about matters of genuine public concern – and that which may 
legitimately be kept private.  So if a person had suffered from an embarrassing 
medical condition or had written a private diary recording some foolish youthful love 
affair, there would not, on Kant’s view, be a public interest defence for publishing 
posthumously what the subject would have wished to keep concealed.  Making no 
exceptions in the case of prominent people or ‘celebrities’, Kant’s position is that 
death makes no difference to what may, or may not, rightly be revealed about a 
person’s more intimate details, and in that regard is not a significant moral dividing-
line (Kant, 111).      
      Kant’s contention that certain kinds of privacy rights can survive death is echoed 
in the  modern literature by T.M. Wilkinson, who, while granting that privacy rights 
are rarely absolute, believes that the fact that living people frequently care about what 
will happen to their bodies or their reputations after death makes it reasonable to 
ascribe such rights to the dead.  Wilkinson tackles head-on the standard objection that 
since the dead are incapable of being distressed by any posthumous intrusions into 
their privacy, they appear to lack the interests that would form the basis of privacy 
rights.  He responds to this by pointing out that privacy interests do not all boil down 
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to interests in avoiding distressing feelings (of shame, embarrassment, belittlement, 
etc.).  For instance, ‘One may value privacy as a way of safeguarding one’s reputation 
and many people would not want their reputations damaged even if they did not know 
about it’ (Wilkinson, 37).  One would likewise not want to be gazed at by a peeping 
Tom whenever one took a shower, even if one never found out about the cheeky 
voyeur.  Since the privacy interests of the living can be invaded without their owners 
being aware of it, Wilkinson argues that the insensibility of the dead is no ground for 
denying that their privacy interests are likewise invaded when archaeologists dig up 
their remains or tabloid editors reveal their guilty secrets (37). 
    This argument, however, is inadequate as it stands, since it fails to address the more 
fundamental objection to ascribing rights to the dead, which is not that the dead are 
insensible but that they are non-existent.  But Wilkinson, like Bloustein, is right to 
point out that in caring about our privacy we do not merely care about the avoidance 
of distressful feelings, and this serves to remove one, albeit not the most basic, 
objection to assigning privacy rights to deceased persons.  The prospect of certain 
embarrassing or shameful personal details transpiring posthumously is highly 
repugnant, even though we know we will not then be distressed by it.  (In fact the 
prospect of posthumous revelation may be even more distasteful than that of 
antemortem revelation, given the impossibility then of our offering any excuse or 
justification.)   
     Søren Holm has argued, in related vein, that two kinds of privacy interest can 
credibly be ascribed to the dead, namely ‘(1) an interest in dignified treatment after 
death and (2) an interest in maintaining one’s good name’ (Holm, 446).  The former 
of these corresponds to number (9) in our list, and Holm notes that it is not always 
easy to know how to treat physical remains in a dignified manner, since ‘[a]n interest 
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in dignified treatment can only be fulfilled if we know what the person would see as 
dignified; and to know that we need to know quite a lot about the person, her culture 
and her place in that culture’ (446).  However, in some cases we have some definite 
information and in others we can hazard some likely guesses.  Some cultures are 
known to have opposed any interference with remains as being undignified, 
sacrilegious or dangerous to the living or the dead.   And if upon completing their 
examinations of the skeletons of ancient people, researchers were to sell the bones to 
a manufacturer of fertilizer, that would be unlikely to count as preserving their dignity 
on anyone’s conception of dignity.  More worryingly for the practice of archaeology 
and physical anthropology, almost any kind of disturbance of burials or examination 
of human remains is sailing close to the wind if our concern is for the dignity of the 
dead.  Here it is perhaps less the fact that human remains are treated as objects of 
study that is problematic than the fact that the research is being done without their 
consent.  People who donate their bodies to medical science presumably do not see 
such use as intrinsically undignified, provided that the research is conducted with 
appropriate decorum; but even they might find it insulting and undignified to be told 
that their bodies would be conscripted for research whether they consented or not.   
     The importance of consent is recognised in the UK’s Human Tissue Act 2004, 
which regulates the use of bodily parts removed from dead persons.  A central 
provision of the Act is that organs may not be removed from the cadaver of a recent 
decedent for purposes of research, transplant or display unless the subject has 
previously given his or her consent in writing.  Exceptions are made in the cases of 
young children, where the consent of their parents or guardians is required instead, 
while adults are entitled to nominate proxies to make decisions on their behalf after 
death.  But the Act dispenses with the need for consent in the case of remains that are 
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more than 100 years old.  This might be thought justified by the extreme unlikelihood 
that older decedents will have conveniently provided written consent for their bodies 
to be conscripted for such purposes.  Yet if consent is so important in the case of more 
recent decedents, it is not really clear why it should be superfluous in the case of older 
ones.  If consent is a necessary condition of the acceptability of using the bodies of 
the recently dead for research purposes, it cannot be equitable to waive this 
requirement in the case of the older dead.  This exemplifies a form of discrimination 
that I have elsewhere labelled ‘recentism’. 4  
    Archaeologists and others who disinter or disturb the bodies of the dead often 
consider that the next-best thing to obtaining the consent of the subjects themselves is 
to obtain that of their genetic or cultural descendants.  When, for instance, a team of 
archaeologists wishes to investigate an ancient burial ground belonging to some First 
Nation tribe or people in the USA, the normal (and since 1990 legally required) 
practice is to obtain the consent of present-day representatives of the Indigenous 
group.  Such proxy consent, though, is neither practically nor morally unproblematic.  
It may be impossible to determine with any precision who the modern genetic 
descendants of the subjects concerned are without conducting the very research whose 
legitimacy is at issue (along with extensive DNA testing of the present population).  
Even identifying cultural descendants can be harder than one might first think.  Holm 
remarks on three factors that can make this difficult, namely: (1) the forking of 
cultures into different branches; (2) the indeterminacy of cultural affiliation (who, for 
example, has the closest affiliation to the ninth-century Vikings whose remains are 
scattered throughout western Europe and beyond?); and (3) the extinction and 
merging of cultures (since cultures rarely remain static for very long, and identity 
conditions for cultures are elusive) (Holm, 442).  To these difficulties may be added a 
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fourth: (4) that in some cases present-day cultural descendants disagree among 
themselves as to whether permission to interfere with ancient human remains should 
be granted or not. 
   Even if these problems could be waived, the question remains whether such proxy 
consent, even if the next-best thing to subject consent, is a good-enough thing.  The 
2004 Human Tissue Act provides for people to nominate proxies to make the relevant 
decisions on their behalf after they are dead.  But there are no such nominated proxies 
for archaeologists to consult.  Nor is it sensible to suppose, counterfactually, that 
such-and-such are the proxies that so-and-so would have chosen, could he or she have 
foreseen the need arising; for with the possible exception of some recent decedents, 
most of those in whom researchers are interested could scarcely have envisaged the 
prospect of becoming objects of scientific attention.  But it does not follow from the 
fact that the persons concerned had no concept of such scientific processes as DNA 
extraction, X-raying or thermal-resonance imaging that the issue of consent lapses.  
Many of the dead were concerned that their bodies should be left in peace forever and 
they would have resented as a gross violation of their privacy any intrusion into their 
graves, however motivated.  Often, as in ancient Egypt, such attitudes derived from 
religious beliefs about the harm that would befall their souls or ghosts if their bodies, 
skeletons or mummies suffered disturbance.  But sometimes the concern with privacy 
may have been a purer one than that: what Wilkinson describes as a valuing of 
privacy as ‘good in itself’ (Wilkinson, 37).  Hence, probably, the famous wording on 
Shakespeare’s memorial at Stratford-on-Avon: ‘Cursed be he that moves my bones.’  
For Shakespeare as for Marvell the grave was a very private place, a no-go area for 
the world at large.    
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3. The Metaphysics of Posthumous Privacy Rights 
It is time to return to the metaphysical worries whose discussion was postponed from 
earlier.  Does it really make sense to speak of the privacy interests of the dead, or to 
ascribe to them privacy rights on the basis of those interests?  Recall Jefferson’s blunt 
claim: ‘[The dead] are nothing; and nothing cannot own something.’  The same line 
has been taken more recently by Ernest Partridge: ‘Nothing happens to the dead… 
[A]fter death, with the removal of a subject of harms and a bearer of interests, it 
would seem that there can be neither “harm to” nor “interests of” the decedent’ 
(Partridge, 253).  Like Jefferson, Partridge takes his stand on the non-existence of the 
dead.  Since the dead are not, then there is no subject any more with moral status, no 
remaining possessor of rights.  Not for Partridge the Kantian move which identifies 
the homo noumenon as the potential object of wrong or harm.  For while Napoleon 
may be eternally human, the absence from the world of the flesh-and-blood man 
entails, on this perspective, that no rights can currently be attributed to him.   
    Actually, Partridge does not think that we have no duties in regard to the dead, even 
though we have no direct duties towards them.  If, for instance, we have made a 
promise to a dying man to deposit his ashes at sea, then we will do wrong if we 
donate his remains to medical research instead.  But this is not, for Partridge, because 
we thereby wrong him; rather, by breaking our promise we undermine trust in the 
socially useful practice of promising.  We ought for similar reasons of public utility to 
respect the testamentary wishes of the dead and refrain from passing on malicious or 
slanderous gossip about them.  While what we may do or say cannot affect the dead 
for better or worse, since all of their interests expired when they did, our acts or words 
can still be right or wrong according to whether they sustain or undermine desirable 
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social practices such as keeping our promises, telling the truth, and avoiding calumny 
and slander.    
    An account on these lines may supply some reason for thinking that we should not 
dispose of a deceased person’s body in a way which lacks her consent, or publish a 
diary she wished to keep private, or tell tales damaging to her reputation.  Since 
respect for privacy is important, then playing fast and loose with it even in 
circumstances where the person ‘affected’ is dead may generate cavalier attitudes 
towards privacy in general. 5  Even so, it is very doubtful whether a Partridgean 
approach really captures all that we normally think wrong about such behaviour when 
it concerns the dead.  Partridge’s line embodies a disconcerting element of pretence: 
the dead have shed all their genuine interests but it behoves us, for the sake of 
defending certain socially useful practices, to treat them as if they were real.  Such a 
metaphysical pretence is hardly well calculated to sustain that other socially useful 
practice of telling the truth.  In any case, it is unlikely that many people believe that 
what mainly makes breaking a promise to a person on her deathbed wrong is that such 
behaviour undermines the socially useful practice of promising (or, for that matter, 
that it dishonours the promise-maker).  In fact, common-sense morality is quite clear, 
contra Partridge, that we act wrongly by the dead when we flout reasonable 
testamentary wishes, or ignore a person’s desire for the disposal of her corpse, or 
posthumously spread slander about her.  
    Imagine (counterfactually!) that one of your professional rivals has died and that 
you busily engage in a course of subtle denigration, revealing to his colleagues that he 
was a secret drinker and womaniser, a covert gambler and a bankrupt.  Even if this 
information is true, your providing it offends against his prima-facie privacy right (4).  
But imagine too that you eventually come to see the error of your ways, and regret 
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bitterly what you have done.  It is not likely that you will condemn yourself only, or 
even mainly, for undercutting some socially useful practices.  You will more probably 
believe that you have treated the deceased as you ought not to have done, erring just 
as you would have done had you breached the confidence or betrayed the trust of a 
still living person.  You recognise that you have not just sinned, but sinned against 
that person.  And the fact that you cannot now apologise to or seek his forgiveness 
may make the sting of conscience even sharper.   
    That this is normal moral phenomenology does not, of course, entail that it is error-
free.  Partridge would claim that it is just an illusion, if a very persistent one, that the 
dead can be moral patients.  Metaphysics, he might say, give the lie to the common 
belief that we can act badly by the dead.  If the dead have no interests, then they 
cannot be harmed, for a harm is a setback to a real interest.  It might seem slightly 
easier to suppose that the dead can still be wronged by, say, having their shameful 
secrets revealed, even if they are not actually harmed by this.  The relations between 
harm and wrong are a large subject, which there is not space to go into here.  I have 
argued elsewhere for the thesis that there are probably no wrongs in the absence of 
harms of some sort. 6  But even if there can be wrongs without harms, the claim that 
the dead can be wronged runs up against the same difficulty as the claim that the dead 
can be harmed, namely that after death there is no subject.  The rock on which 
Partridge and Jefferson found their objection to common sense is the impossibility of 
doing any harm or wrong to something that doesn’t exist. 
     Still, rocks that cannot be removed may be able to be bypassed and that, I think, is 
the case here.  Consideration of the moral phenomenology suggests a way of 
reframing the issues in a way that makes more intelligible what we care about when 
we concern ourselves with posthumous privacy.  Talk about the privacy interests of 
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the dead appears to founder on the non-existence of dead subjects.  But not so talk 
about the interests of the living in maintaining their privacy, and maintaining it 
whatever the date.   Because people care what others think about them, they are 
naturally concerned about the intentional attitudes with which others hold towards 
them, not only while they are living but also after they are dead.   Someone who has 
striven while alive to conceal an embarrassing personal secret is not normally 
sanguine about the prospect of its coming to light posthumously.  This would be 
irrational if the core of the unease was a fear of hurt feelings.  But it is not 
unreasonable if it is a fear of losing dignity.  A person can be held in high or low 
esteem irrespective of whether she is living or dead.  A dignified or undignified 
reputation is one of the abstract things which Kant claimed can ‘cling to’ a person 
beyond the boundaries of her life.  While the awareness of others’ contempt, disgust, 
dislike or disapproval is among the most painful of human experiences, we are pained 
precisely because we think that being held in such attitudes is an evil in itself.  As 
Bloustein notes, the primary reason why a breach of privacy is offensive is that it 
flouts a person’s right to be represented as he wishes; an unwarranted breach of 
privacy is therefore a ‘dignitary tort’ regardless of whether the subject’s feelings are 
also hurt (Bloustein, 1002).   
   The claim that posthumous privacy matters because living persons care about it 
does, however, invite the question whether such care could rest on a misconception of 
their real interests stemming from a failure to grasp imaginatively the true finality of 
death.  The dead are not merely permanently unconscious or sleeping subjects of 
dignified or undignified treatment: they have ceased to be subjects at all (and a corpse 
is not a personal subject).  It therefore looks as though nothing that happens 
posthumously can be either good or bad for the previously- living person.  
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   Yet to focus in this way on the non-being of the dead is misleading, since it draws 
attention away from something else of prime importance, namely the human mode of 
being in the world.  Human beings are social creatures, and the self-identifications of 
individuals are determined largely by the relations in which they take themselves to 
stand to others.  Because the social context in which we live, in both its intimate and 
its more public aspects, is much larger than we are and will survive after we are gone, 
we are naturally concerned for our standing within it, not only within our lifetime but 
also afterwards.  Our social relationships do not all evaporate when we die, since the 
framework remains in which we can be remembered, discussed, honoured, praised or 
dispraised, retain our lifetime secrets intact or have our cover blown.  A person who is 
anxious that some embarrassing secret that she has concealed during her lifetime 
should not come out after her death need not be labouring under the mistaken belief 
that this would harm her ghost.  Her fear is that such revelation will negatively affect 
her standing within the social frame, so that people will no longer think of her with 
the same respect as they previously did.  Knowing that her current good repute 
depends on her ability to mask the truth, she is painfully aware that it is liable to 
upset. 7  And if they come to learn that truth later, then her reputation is likely to be 
damaged not only through the revelation of the secret but also by the knowledge that 
she attempted to conceal it.    
    To represent posthumous privacy interests as the interests of the living rather than 
of the dead circumvents the objection that it is senseless to attribute either good or 
evil to the dead.  But this line of thought may seem to involve a counter-intuitive 
claim.  If it is not the dead who suffer by posthumous invasions of privacy but the 
living, then how can this be possible when they have not yet suffered those invasions?  
How can a living person suffer on account of something that will not happen to him 
21 
 
during his life?  To be sure, one may anticipate with fear or anxiety potential evils to 
come, but the question is whether, and if so how, what is anticipated is an evil in cases 
where the subject will then be dead.   
    This puzzle can be answered by some further articulation of the considerations just 
adduced.  People care about their privacy because they care about their dignity, and 
invasions of privacy threaten dignity by removing or reducing a person’s ability to 
control how he is represented in public perception.  Since those perceptions outlast the 
individuals they concern, living people are naturally concerned about how they will 
be represented after they are gone.  This is because they are concerned about how they 
are publicly represented tout court.  The wish to maintain their dignity in others’ eyes, 
is a wish to maintain it for as long as others have eyes to regard them.  Posthumous 
events such as the revelation of a person’s private diaries, or the use of his physical 
remains for medical research or as a memento mori, may constitute serious defeats for 
such lifetime desires.  Although he will not experience this flouting of his wishes, the 
wishes themselves, as Joel Feinberg colourfully puts it, have been effectively 
‘squelched’ (Feinberg, 93).  What he desired was not going to come about, even if 
that failure could not have been known, or reasonably predicted, at the time.  
    This account borrows from the view expounded by George Pitcher, Joel Feinberg 
and others, that the best way to account for the possibility of posthumous harm and 
wrong is to identify the object of the harm or wrong as the antemortem person, that is, 
the person as she is before the point of death. 8  The dead may, as Jefferson says, be 
nothing, but the antemortem person is unquestionably something.  Things that happen 
after a person’s death can affect the significance of her life for better or worse by 
promoting or setting back the interests that she had during life.  Where posthumous 
events cast a dark backward shadow, then, as Feinberg explains, ‘the antemortem 
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person was harmed in being the subject of interests that were going to be defeated 
whether he knew it or not’ (Feinberg, 91).  And a living person’s interest in 
maintaining her privacy in order to maintain her dignity in the public eye (or simply 
in the eye of particular people whose opinion she cares about) is especially vulnerable 
to being upset by posthumous events over which she has no control.  
 
4. Conclusion: Practicalities 
I have argued that privacy interests and rights should be seen as possessions of the 
living, and that breaches of privacy after their deaths are morally significant for 
antemortem persons.  In concluding, I should like to look briefly at some of the 
practical implications of this position.  The discussion in Section 2 of the variety of 
privacy rights sketched in broad terms how some of these might apply in regard to the 
dead.  But it did not pursue questions about the finer interpretation of these putative 
rights, or about the amount of weight to be ascribed to them, or how conflicts between 
privacy rights and other rights should be resolved (particularly where the privacy 
rights of dead people appear in tension with other rights of the living), or who should 
be responsible for protecting the privacy of the dead.   These are important questions 
which call for a much more detailed discussion than there is space for here.  But some 
preliminary remarks may be helpful. 
    An initial, if somewhat truistic, point to make is that there are no convenient 
algorithms for responding to these questions.  There is no substitute in this area for 
sensitive, reflective moral judgement.  (There is also, of course, plentiful room for 
legitimate disagreement in the answers that thoughtful people make to them.)  But I 
should like to sound one warning note and make one recommendation.  The warning 
is against thinking that because the dead cannot have their feelings hurt, there can be 
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no genuinely offensive intrusions into their privacy.  The obvious inability of the dead 
to experience shame or embarrassment is probably the main reason why posthumous 
privacy is often treated in a markedly cavalier manner.  But this is quite wrong, 
because offences against privacy, or so it has been argued in this paper, are first and 
foremost assaults on personal dignity rather than subjective peace of mind.  Moreover, 
as I have also tried to show, properly considered they offend the dignity of living 
persons, whose entitlement to moral consideration is undeniable.     
    The recommendation I should like to offer is for a practical rule of thumb, namely, 
that we should normally not invade the privacy of the dead in circumstances in which, 
or in a manner in which, we would think it wrong to invade that of the living.  In other 
words, agents should show the same respect for the privacy of persons whether they 
are currently living or dead.  So, for example, if it would have been wrong to reveal 
(or purport to reveal) during a certain great twentieth-century philosopher’s life that 
he occasionally visited male prostitutes in London, then doing so after his death (as 
one of his biographers has done) is equally inadmissible.  The principle is likewise 
rooted in the claim already defended in this paper, that the interest in the preservation 
of posthumous privacy is properly an interest of living people; hence the equal 
treatment it calls for of privacy before and after death is really in both cases the 
treatment of the living.    
     Just as the privacy rights of currently living people sometimes have to give way in 
response to considerations of the public interest, so too they may have to do in the 
case of the no-longer alive.  The private diary or emails of a terrorist suspect may 
reasonably be read by the police after his death as well as before it.  The medical 
record of a recently-deceased person may need to be made available to the guardians 
of public health who urgently need to trace the source of some infectious disease.  
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And biographers, historians and journalists are entitled to throw some light 
posthumously on the private lives of significant figures (or so-called ‘celebrities’) 
who have sought publicity during life, and who may therefore be deemed to have 
given a measure of consent.  Such consent is important too, as we saw earlier, in the 
context of medical or other research, or the display for religious or artistic purposes, 
of human physical remains.  And given that it is wrong to view or examine a living 
person’s body without her consent, or to enter her home uninvited, to do the same 
with her dead body, or to disturb its resting-place, is to act in a manner that might be 
considered out of moral order. 
    Does this conclusion rule out those practices of archaeologists which involve the 
disturbance of the non-consenting dead?   Since it is obviously impossible to ask the 
consent of the former owners of those remains which interest archaeologists, some 
might argue that this gives the green light to their activities, on the ground that they 
cannot fairly be expected to satisfy an impossible moral demand.  Alternatively it 
could be claimed that the permanent unresponsiveness of the dead means that the light 
remains permanently at red.  Here the rule of thumb, which places no absolute 
prohibition on incursions into privacy, provides no definitive answer. But morally 
prudent archaeologists would do well to adopt a maxim of minimum disturbance 
compatible with the achievement of significant research aims. Here modern 
technology can help relieve the moral strain, with thermal imaging and the use of X-
rays, for instance, enabling the acquisition of physical data by non-destructive and 
non-intrusive processes that were once impossible.  Where such techniques are not 
practicable, then excavation should be restrained and respectful, with sampling 
techniques replacing wholesale disturbance of remains.    
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Notes 
1. On these more general issues see, for instance, Thomson 1975, Scanlon 1975, 
Parent 1983, Inness 1992, Paul, Miller and Paul 2000, DeCew 2006.   
2. People in certain cultural traditions believe, or have in the past believed, that 
disturbance of their interred remains can cause harm to their souls or spirits.  
This might be thought to give rise to a special reason for respecting the 
privacy of their burials even by those who do not share that belief.  This is the 
requirement to pay respect to human cultural traditions, which is itself a mode 
of respecting human dignity.   
3. But there are exceptions, generally motivated by religious reasons.  For 
instance, in the Capuchin Catacomb at Palermo, Sicily, can be seen the 
embalmed remains of hundreds of wealthy Palermitans, fully clothed and 
preserved in ‘lifelike’ poses, who between the seventeenth and early twentieth 
centuries donated their bodies to serve as ‘auto-icons’ to provide the living 
with a grisly reminder of mortality.  Whether or not these individuals felt any 
shyness at the prospect of having their remains put on show, they waived their 
right to conventional Christian burial as a grace-gaining penitential act.  Many 
present-day visitors to the Catacomb, however, find the display indecent and 
feel a vicarious shame at the making public of what ought to be kept private.      
4. See Scarre 2012, insert page.  
5. It might be counter-suggested that since it is hard to see what is wrong with 
such normally bad practices as revealing secrets or breaking promises where 
their targets or ‘victims’ are the dead, who are incapable of being hurt, it 
would be reasonable to develop the convention that breaking promises or 
passing slander is a tolerated exception in their case. But such dualism of 
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practice would be likely to reduce the respect in which moral rules are 
normally held, and induce the devious to look for further exceptions (‘If we 
may slander the dead, why not also living people who’ll never find out about 
it?’).  It should also be remembered that the dead were once real people, with 
personal interests, intimate secrets, and reputations they cared about.  Once 
suppose that keeping promises to, or telling the truth about, or respecting the 
privacy of real people can be dispensed with in certain circumstances and the 
moral brakes have been dangerously loosened.   
6. See Scarre, forthcoming.    
7. Note that she may not herself think there is anything bad or wrong about the 
fact or feature she wishes to conceal.  But, like most people, she is sensitive to 
the thought of being discredited in the eyes of others.  
8. The view that it is the antemortem subject that is affected, for good or ill, by 
posthumous events has understandably generated controversy since it was first 
advanced by Pitcher and Feinberg.  In the present paper I am less concerned to 
defend the view in depth than to outline its bearing on the question of whether 
privacy rights expire when life does.  Further defence of the Pitcher/Feinberg 
line can be found in, for instance, Luper 2004 and 2009 and Scarre 2007.  For 
criticism see, inter alia, Glannon 2001, Taylor 2005, Belshaw 2009. 
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